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Some Personal Observations About
Values and Assumptions:
What Can Jim Teach Wilma and the Board?
ROBERT J. RABINt
I came to know Jim Atleson when I worked with him on
the first edition of our widely unknown casebook, Collective
Bargaining in Private Employment.' It was a joy to work
with Jim. We discovered that the geographical center for
the five authors was New York City, and so we stayed at the
Algonquin Hotel and enjoyed restaurants and plays while
we debated the contours of the book.
Jim's unique contribution to the casebook was the
opening historical section.2 We had some of the classic cases
on criminal conspiracy and labor injunctions, excerpts from
several of the best labor historians, and historical notes
prepared by Jim himself.3 In those materials, Jim teased out
some of the values that animated the courts' decisions,4
t Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law. I was a co-author
with Professor Atleson and others of two editions of Collective Bargaining in
Private Employment, published by BNA Books in 1978 and 1984. I thank
Camille M. Castro, about to become a third year student at the College of Law,
for her superb research assistance and constant encouragement and good cheer
in helping prepare this article.
1. JAMES B. ATLESON, ROBERT J. RABIN, GEORGE SCHATZKI, HERBERT L.
SHERMAN, JR. & EILEEN SILVERSTEIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT (1st ed. 1978) [hereinafter
ATLESON ET AL.].
2. See id. at 1-45.
3. See id. The cases included Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900), and
a summary of the Philadelphia Cordwainers case. Commonwealth v. Pullis,
(Phila. Mayor's Ct. 1806), reprinted in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59-248 (John R. Common et al. eds., 1958). Also, the
readings included excerpts from Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case,
41 YALE L.J. 165 (1931), and Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35
YALE L.J. 825 (1926), as well as generous notes prepared by Jim, drawing upon
the work of labor historians.
4. ATLESON ET AL., supra note 1, at 21 (discussing Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44
N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896)).
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presaging his work in Values and Assumptions.5 He exposed
those opinions for what they really were-not expressions of
established doctrine, but reflections of the values of common
law judges.6 Only with that historical background could
students understand the later statutory enactments that
are the heart of the casebook and a course on labor law.
At about the time I was invited to participate in this
conference, I had just completed an arbitration award that
had been deferred to arbitration by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board).' Under the deferral
doctrine,8 if the union files a charge and the Board
determines that the issue may be resolved through
arbitration, the Board directs the parties to try to resolve
the dispute through that machinery.9 If the parties agree to
this procedure, I must send the NLRB a copy of my award
so that the Board can make sure it is not "repugnant" to the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act), under the Board's
current standard of review. °
In my particular case, the company had unilaterally
banned smoking on all company property, following years of
a practice in which they consistently negotiated the issue
with the union. As a result of the new rule, employees had
to trek across the parking lot to a public highway to have a
smoke. This took up most of the break time, and, in the long
and harsh winter months of upstate New York, could be
quite a hardship.
5. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw
(1983).
6. See ATLESON ETAL., supra note 1, at 1-45.
7. See IBEW v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., No. 3-CA-26507 (Dec. 7, 2007)
(Rabin, Arb.) (unreported) (on file with the author).
8. The original deferral doctrine is from Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955) (stating that the proceedings in arbitration must
appear to be fair and regular, the parties must agree to be bound by the decision
of the arbitrator, and the decision of the arbitrator must not be "clearly
repugnant" to the purposes and the policies of the Act). The court also
articulated a fourth part of the doctrine in Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884-
86 (1963) (stating that the arbitrator must consider and decide the unfair labor
practice issue).
9. Raytheon, 140 N.L.R.B at 884-86.
10. See Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082 (stating that arbitrator's decision
must not be "clearly repugnant" to the purposes and policies of the Act).
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The case struck me as an obvious one to require
bargaining. However, the company cited and briefed an
NLRB case that on analogous facts concluded that
bargaining was not required. That case involved making
employees park in a different parking lot, further away,
requiring a walk that was about as long as the one in my
case. The majority held that the walk and inconvenience
were not sufficiently burdensome to meet the Board's test of
"material, substantial, and significant."'1 What was I to do?
Fortunately, there was a dissent by Wilma Liebman.
Seeing the situation through the eyes of the workers, Board
Member and now Chairman Liebman perceived that,
especially in the cold, dark months of winter, this change
had a real world impact upon the workers.12
I had two thoughts about Member Liebman's dissent.
First, it shows that the question of substantial impact is
ultimately a factual issue, and so I could make the factual
call that in my case the smoking policy change had a
substantial impact upon employees, and this conclusion
would not be repugnant to the Act.
Second, I thought what everyone in this conference
probably thought: thank goodness that Wilma Liebman has
been a Board Member all these years.' 3 For, in a world in
which the Board is constantly changing direction, Liebman
has presented a constant and strong vision of the purposes
of the Act, one that I think is true to the statutory intent. I
believe she has learned much from Values and
Assumptions, which she refers to several times in her paper
in this volume.
Our other panelist, Virginia Seitz, paid Jim the highest
accolade a former student could offer her former law
professor: She actually found his book useful in her work. I
11. Berkshire Nursing Home, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 220, 221 (2005). The Board
held that in order to trigger the obligation to bargain, it is not enough that a
change merely disadvantage an employee, but rather the change must be
"material, substantial and significant." Id. (quoting Crittendon Hosp., 342
N.L.R.B. 686, 686 (2004)).
12. See id. at 222 (Member Liebman, dissenting).
13. Wilma Liebman has served as a member of the NLRB since November 14,
1997. President Clinton first appointed Liebman, and President Bush
subsequently reappointed her to serve second and third terms. On January 20,
2009, President Obama appointed Liebman as Chairman of the NLRB.
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suspect that when Jim heard that, he asked himself, "Now
where did I go wrong?" Virginia skillfully showed us how
you could advance your case by understanding the
assumptions of the judges who are deciding the case, and by
placing your case within their comfort zone and within the
values that they share.
These inspiring presentations raise an important
question for me. It has to do with respect for the NLRB as
an institution, in light of a cycle of changes in Board
doctrine over the last couple of decades. As Liebman points
out in her paper, the Clinton Board, on which she first
served, made numerous changes to existing Board law. She
describes them as modest, but I think that some of them,
like the decision to extend the Act's coverage to graduate
students, are very important, not only symbolically, but in
terms of their actual impact on workers. 4 The Bush Board
in turn reversed many of those decisions. 5 The reversals are
summarized in Liebman's paper, and she observes that
some of them push the doctrine back even further than
where the Clinton Board took it.
The full Obama Board is likely to be in place soon, and
as Chairman, Wilma Liebman will be a key member. 6 The
new Board will undoubtedly revisit many of these cases,
and in many, I think the Board will reinstate rulings of the
Clinton Board. As Ms. Liebman said in her paper, it will be
Groundhog Day all over.
As a law teacher, I try to convince my students that
there is something called law-a body of decisions that
reflects the values of our society. The late John Mortimer's
Rumpole muses in Rumpole & la Carte that "the law
represents some attempt, however fumbling, to impose
14. See the Bush Board's decision in Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483
(2004), which overruled the Clinton Board decision of New York University, 332
N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000). New York University originally extended § 2(3) of the Act
to graduate students. Brown University reversed New York University, holding
that graduate students are not employees under § 2(3) of the Act.
15. See, for example, the Bush Board's decision in H.S. Care, L.L.C., 343
N.L.R.B. 659 (2004), which overruled the Clinton Board case M.B. Sturgis, Inc.,
331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000). H.S. Care held that contingent workers are not in the
same unit as regular employees.
16. Wilma Liebman is currently serving her third term, which will expire on
August 27, 2011.
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order on a chaotic universe."" But the oscillating Board
decisions seem primarily to impose chaos. When I worked
on our casebook, I tried to convince Jim and the other
authors, somewhat facetiously, that we should have a
pocket part, so that we can replace the Board decisions of
one administration with those of another. How do you instill
in students that there is some underlying set of principles
and values that explains these decisions in terms other than
raw politics?
By the same token, how do you convince a reviewing
court that the Board's decision deserves deference, even if
the court might reach a different result? In the various
editions of our labor law casebook, even after Jim no longer
worked with us, we included a number of cases in which the
Supreme Court had to decide whether to defer to a decision
of the NLRB. The decisions were all over the place, and it
was hard to find a consistent rationale. For example, in the
fairly recent "salting" case, NLRB v. Town & Country
Electric, Inc.,'" the Court upheld the Board's decision that
employees who were also on the payroll of the union and
who took a job in order to help organize the workers were
"employees" under the broad definition of that term in the
Act."9 Justice Breyer wrote, "the Board often possesses a
degree of legal leeway when it interprets its governing
statute, particularly where Congress likely intended an
understanding of labor relations to guide the Act's
application."2 Justice Breyer thought the answer compelled
by the statute was so clear that the Board needed "very
little legal leeway" to convince the Court it was correct.2' In
Erie Resistor,22 the Court upheld the Board's conclusion that
giving striker replacements "super- seniority" (more
seniority than the most senior worker who went on strike)
violated the Act.23 The Court deferred to the Board's
"experienced eye."24 However, in Insurance Agents',"25 when
17. JOHN MORTIMER, RUMPOLE A LA CARTE 1 (1990).
18. 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
19. Id. at 87.
20. Id. at 89-90.
21. Id. at 90.
22. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
23. Id. at 225.
24. Id. at 230.
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the Board held that the union's use of the strike
demonstrated that it was not bargaining in good faith,26 the
Court rejected the Board's position, concluding that "when
the Board moves in this area, with only § 8(b)(3) for support,
it is functioning as an arbiter of the sort of economic
weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of
their bargaining demands."27 In American Ship Building,28
the Court reversed the Board for concluding that the
employer's use of the lockout violated the Act29 :
There is of course no question that the Board is entitled to the
greatest deference in recognition of its special competence in
dealing with labor problems. . . .However, we think that the
Board construes its functions too expansively when it claims
general authority to define national labor poliy by balancing the
competing interests of labor and management.
3
I suppose that by a careful and imaginative analysis, a
commentator could make some sense out of the pattern in
which the Court defers to some decisions and not to others.
However, a cynic might conclude that the degree of judicial
scrutiny really turns on whether the Court agrees with the
decision on the merits. In Values and Assumptions, Jim
points out the irony of the courts making the ultimate policy
call when the Act was designed to curb the judicial
imposition of values, and instead give the Board the role of
primary interpreter of the Act.31 Of the three entities of
government involved-legislature, agency, and court-the
Court would seem to have the least expertise and
competence to make these value decisions. In our field we
live out our own version of the Chevron32 problem as the
dance continues between Board and Court.
25. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
26. Id. at 494-95.
27. Id. at 497.
28. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
29. Id. at 318.
30. Id. at 316.
31. See ATLESON, supra note 5, at 30.
32. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). The Chevron problem is essentially that a federal court will give
deference to an administrative body's permissible interpretation of a statute,
even if that interpretation is not the best one.
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The challenge of the current Board, with Liebman as
Chairman, is to write decisions that earn the respect and
deference of reviewing courts. But this is harder to do each
time the Board shifts positions because each switch feeds
the perception that the Board's decisions are not based upon
its greater expertise or its careful analysis, but upon the
changing political winds. What can the Obama Board do to
command greater deference by reviewing courts? What can
Jim teach Wilma and her colleagues?
Liebman describes a number of examples in which she
thinks the Board has lost its way, and all of them raise
important issues. I want to describe just one of these issues,
for it presents one of the more stark examples of the twists
and turns in Board policy.
The question is whether in a non-unionized workplace
an employee who is summoned for questioning is entitled to
bring another employee with her to act as her representative.
Section 7 of the Act states that "[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through their
representatives . . . and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."33 Does it confer this right of
representation upon the worker in a non-union setting?
In the 1975 Weingarten34 decision, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether an employee in a unionized
workplace had the right to refuse his employer's command
that he attend an investigation that had potential
disciplinary consequences, unless his union representative
could be with him.35 In that case, an employee named
Collins was suspected of taking money from the cash
register.36 When summoned for questioning, Collins asked
for her shop steward or some other union representative to
be with her.37 The employer refused, and Collins went
through the interview alone.38 Collins held her own even
33. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)
(emphasis added).
34. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
35. Id. at 252-53.
36. Id. at 254.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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without her representative, and convinced the company that
she did not do it.39 However, in an ironic turn, when the
company told Collins she had been vindicated, she blurted
out that the only thing she had ever gotten from the
company without paying for it was her free lunch.4" This led
to a further investigation, another refusal to allow Collins'
shop steward to attend the interview, and yet another
exoneration.41 The Court upheld the Board's conclusion that
the company's refusal to allow her shop steward to be
present violated Collins' rights under section 7 of the Act.n"
The Weingarten right is qualified. The Court made clear
that the right attaches only if the employee requests it and
where the threat of discipline is obvious. 43 The opinion also
states that the exercise of the Weingarten right "may not
interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives," a
qualification whose breadth is not indicated in the opinion."
The dimension of the right is somewhat limited. The
employee does not have an absolute right to have her
representative present.45 Rather, if the employee refuses to
participate without the assistance of her representative, the
employer may conduct the investigation without
interviewing the employee in question.46 But the bottom line
is that it may not discipline the employee for refusing to
attend the interview without her union representative.47
Weingarten took place in a unionized setting, and there
is no indication that the Weingarten Court gave any thought
to the application of its doctrine to a non-union workplace.
One of the hurdles Ms. Collins had to overcome in
Weingarten was to meet the statutory obligation of
concerted activity.48 After all, she was the only employee in
39. Id. at 255.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 255-56.
42. Id. at 267.
43. Id. at 257.
44. See id. at 258.
45. Id. at 259.
46. Id. at 258.
47. Id. at 259.
48. Id. at 260.
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jeopardy.49 However Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
pointed out that the union representative who is asked to
come into the picture has in mind the interests of the entire
bargaining unit, to make sure that this sort of thing doesn't
happen to others." Justice Brennan observed that because
the employee standing alone has little power to alter the
outcome, this "perpetuates the inequality the Act was
designed to eliminate," and the attendance of the union
representative corrects that imbalance. 1 You could read the
opinion to suggest that even in the non-union setting the
representative would have in mind the interests of others,
thus satisfying the requirement of concerted activity and
that the presence of another worker mitigates to at least
some extent the inequality of power.
The Board first applied the Weingarten right to a
nonunionized workplace in the 1982 Materials Research
case. " Ronald Reagan had recently been elected President,
and this may have been one of the last gasps of the Board
appointed during the previous Democratic administration.
In Materials Research, the Board located the right to
representation in section 7 rather than section 9, and
concluded that as a result the Weingarten right did not
depend upon whether the employees were represented by a
union that obtained its status through section 9.53
But just a few years later, in 1985, the Reagan Board
reversed Materials Research in the Sears54 case, concluding
that an employer has a statutory right to deal with
employees on an individual basis where there is no union."
The Board that decided Sears then defended its position in
the Third Circuit in the DuPont case, where the court
upheld the Board position. 6 There, the Board stated that its
49. Id.
50. Id. at 260-61.
51. Id. at 262. But compare Justice Brennan's opinion in NLRB v. City
Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (finding that concerted activity
seemed to rest at least in part upon the union's role in a unionized workplace).
52. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1010 (1982).
53. Id.
54. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
55. Id. at 231.
56. E.I. DuPont & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988).
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position represented a "permissible" rather than mandatory
interpretation of the Act.57 The Board stated that the
Weingarten right had no place in the nonunion setting
because the representative had no statutory duty of fair
representation, and was less likely than in a union setting
to safeguard the needs of the entire work force, and was also
less likely to have the skills of a union representative.58 The
Board concluded that the employee would lose his best
chance to tell his side of the story if he insisted on a
representative, as the employer would most likely proceed
with the investigation anyway, and, in contrast to the union
setting, where arbitration is available, the employee would
have no other forum in which to tell his story.59
This remained the state of the law until fairly late in the
Clinton Board's tenure. In the 2000 Epilepsy Foundation"
decision, the Board, including Member Liebman, returned
to the rule of Materials Research, holding that Weingarten
rights apply to a nonunionized workplace.6' In Epilepsy
Foundation, two employees wrote a memo critical of their
supervisor." When one of them was called in to explain
himself, he insisted that the other be present." The
employer turned down that request, and when the first
employee refused to attend alone, he was terminated for
insubordination.' The Board rested its decision on the
language of section 7, which draws no distinction based
upon union representation, and indeed would seem to
compel such a conclusion from the "other" language in
section 7 that I underscored earlier.65 The Board also rested
upon its earlier decision in Materials Research, and upon its
conclusion that the concerns expressed by the Board in the
intervening cases were not compelling.66 These included the
57. Id. at 628.
58. Id. at 629-30.
59. Id. at 630.
60. Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 676 (2000).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 677.
66. Id.
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argument that the representative would not take into the
account the interests of other workers or might not have the
skills necessary for effective representation.
The Board that came to power during the Bush
administration in turn reversed Epilepsy Foundation in the
2004 IBM decision.6" The Board in IBM conceded that the
application of Weingarten rights to a nonunionized workplace
was "a permissible construction of the Act," taking the same
position as the Reagan Board did when it defended its
position in the Sears case before the court.69 So the Board
viewed its task as determining as a policy matter which of
the competing views to follow.7" Repeating the
considerations raised by the Board in the Sears case, which
I summarized earlier, the Board in IBM concluded that the
Weingarten right had no place in the nonunion setting.7 1
But the Board in IBM went even further in justification
of its position. It said that developments since Epilepsy
Foundation make it more imperative for the employer to
engage in investigations, and cited a parade of horribles,
such as illegal aliens in the workforce, the increase in
workplace violence and harassment, the recent examples of
corporate misfeasance, and the dangers of terrorism after
the September 11 attacks.72 Because of these threats, the
concerns expressed by the Board when presenting its Sears
rationale to the courts become even more real.73 One of those
arguments seemed especially compelling to the IBM Board:
a co-worker who is not in a union cannot be trusted to
maintain the confidentiality of information she learns in the
investigation, while a union representative, by virtue of her
67. Id. at 677-78.
68. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004). In IBM, the employer denied
three non-union-represented employees' requests to have a coworker present
during investigatory interviews. Within one month of the interviews, the
employer discharged all three employees. In reversing Epilepsy Foundation, the
Board held that employees who work in a nonunion workplace are not entitled
under section 7 to have a coworker accompany them to an interview with their
employer. Id.
69. Id. at 1289.
70. Id. at 1290.
71. Id. at 1291.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1291.
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obligations under the duty of fair representation, can be
trusted.74
Jim exposes this myth of the irresponsibility of workers
in a chapter in Values and Assumptions on work
stoppages." On the question of the right of a worker to
refuse hazardous work, Jim points out that the law places a
heavy burden upon the worker because of the value of
uninterrupted production, and "the assumption that employees
are unreliable and irresponsible judges of workplace
safety."76 Ultimately, the Board rested its conclusion in IBM
on a balancing of the advantage to an employee of having a
representative present with the employer's need to conduct
prompt and thorough confidential investigations."
The dissent in IBM, by Members Liebman and Walsh,
questioned whether there was any empirical evidence to
support the worries claimed by the majority." The dissent
began, "Today, American workers without unions, the
overwhelming majority of employees, are stripped of a right
integral to workplace democracy. 7
9
At this writing we don't know the composition of the
Obama Board. However, I expect that Chairman Liebman's
tenure will continue for a while, and it safe to say that the
new Board will be inclined to go back to the rule of Epilepsy
Foundation. I am concerned with how the Board's decisions
on this and other key issues will fare in the reviewing
courts. The Board is entitled to deference by the courts, as I
have indicated in cases I cited and quoted earlier. However,
the Obama Board may have a more difficult task of
justifying its position if it overrules IBM and goes back to
the rule of Epilepsy. That would be the fifth change in the
Board's position, starting with Materials Research. It is
reminiscent in some ways of the experience in the 80s and
90s when an executive agency, the Department of
Transportation, tried to impose an airbag requirement upon
74. Id. at 1292.
75. ATLESON, supra note 5, at 97-107.
76. Id. at 100.
77. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1288.
78. Id. at 1305 (Members Liebman & Walsh, dissenting).
79. Id.
720 [Vol. 57
2009] WHAT CAN JIM TEACH THE BOARD?
the auto industry."0 It is hard to imagine there was a time
when the auto industry resisted this development, but
recent events demonstrate that the industry has not kept
up very well with the times. In any event, the Department's
position varied with each new presidential election. When
President Reagan's Transportation Secretary refused to
continue the air bag requirement imposed by the previous
administration, the Supreme Court rejected its position
because it was so political in nature." Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that it was quite appropriate
for an executive agency to reflect the will of the voters who
elected that administration. 2
What can the new Board do to insure that its decision is
affirmed in the reviewing courts? How can the new Board
earn respect and confidence that its decisions rest upon
rational considerations and not upon the changes in
administration?
The application of the Weingarten rule to the non-
unionized workplace raises serious questions of policy and
practicality. This might be an ideal issue to address through
rulemaking. The NLRB stands relatively alone among
agencies in its use of the adjudicative model as opposed to
rulemaking. However, it has used rulemaking from time to
time, 3 and the Court has upheld its choice of procedure.
80. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (Sept. 1,
1981).
81. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
82. See Justice Rehnquist's language:
A change in administration brought about by the people casting their
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As
long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress,
it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in
light of the philosophy of the administration.
Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); NLRB v. Nat'l
Jewish Hosp., 593 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr.,
586 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. St. Joseph Hosp., 587 F.2d 1060, 1064
(10th Cir. 1978); St. John's Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368
(10th Cir. 1977).
84. See Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 492-93, 507; Presbyterian Med. Ctr.,
586 F.2d at 166.
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While adjudication may provide a sharper focus on an issue
when it is tied to the particular facts and litigants involved,
the search for a more general, universal rule may be better
accomplished through rulemaking, where a wider array of
voices and interests may be heard. The use of rulemaking
may convince a reviewing court that the Board has brought
a new range of considerations to the problem, thus
justifying its change of position.
In terms of its impact upon individual situations, there
is no doubt that the Weingarten rule may be more effective
for workers in the unionized setting. To begin with, the
relationship between the union and management is
institutionalized. The parties are used to dealing with one
another. The steward who assists a worker in a disciplinary
interview is likely to have had more experience with these
sorts of issues, and her opinion and advice may be more
respected by management. More significantly, the greatest
spur to effective representation in a union setting is the
realization that if a satisfactory solution is not reached at
the investigative stage the resulting discipline may be
challenged by the union through arbitration. Many
arbitrators conclude that just cause requires procedural
fairness in the investigation, and that the denial of union
representation may invalidate the resulting discipline.5
From the limited sampling of my own experiences in
arbitration, it appears that some collective bargaining
agreements expressly provide for such a right. Management
in a unionized setting has a double incentive to allow a
representative to be present at the interview. One is to
settle the matter in order to avoid a challenge through
arbitration. Another is to comply with the procedural
requirements of just cause that may come into play if the
matter is arbitrated.
In contrast, the worker in the non-unionized workplace
has little or no recourse if she cannot convince the employer
not to discipline her. She does not have the fall back of
arbitration. If the employer opposes the presence of a
representative during the investigation, under Weingarten
the employee need not be permitted to attend, but she will
then forfeit her only chance to tell her story, as the
85. See In re Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359, 363-64 (1966)
(Daugherty, Arb.) (establishing seven elements of "just cause").
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employer is likely to conduct the investigation without her. 6
The employer has much less incentive to permit the
representative to attend the investigation, as the resulting
discipline will not be tested through arbitration, and there
will be no issue of a denial of just cause if the representative
is not allowed to attend. 7 The employee may have more to
lose than the employer if the representative is not permitted
to attend.88
As the IBM Board viewed it, employer concerns about
the confidentiality of the interview process are heightened
in the contemporary workplace.89 The new Board must make
a careful analysis of whether these are legitimate concerns.
But any modification of the Weingarten rule should be
limited to those situations where there is a genuine concern
with security or with the other problems raised in IBM.9" I
suspect that most interrogations involve the garden-variety
types of infractions that involve the ordinary failings of
workers and not the heightened concerns put forth in IBM.9
The Board can craft special rules for these circumstances if
appropriate.
The balancing inquiry put forth in IBM is too narrow if
on one side of the equation it focuses on just the
effectiveness of the Weingarten rule to protect the individual
worker in a non-union setting. Such a limited analysis
might well lead the Board to conclude, as it did in IBM, that
the potential compromises in confidentiality outweigh the
limited gains an employee may achieve by having a
Weingarten right.92
However, the policy issues go beyond the practical
concerns about the protections of a single employee in
individual cases. At stake here is the larger question of the
purpose of section 7 of the Act.93 The statutory language,
which uses the term "other" twice, suggests that the
86. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 258 (1975).
87. Id. at 262.
88. Id. at 263-64.
89. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1290 (2004).
90. Id. at 1290.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1289.
93. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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protections of the Act are not limited to workers in a
unionized setting. 4 As Virginia Seitz suggests in her paper,
it is reasonable to assume that courts will be faithful to
statutory language. This is the clear import of the Court's
landmark decision in Washington Aluminum95 that section 7
protects the rights of workers in a non-unionized shop to
protest unreasonably cold conditions by walking off the
job. 96
The policy behind that expansive reading of the scope of
section 7 requires a deeper understanding of the organizing
process. Unions do not appear overnight. They come about
only through a tedious process of building relationships and
trust among workers and, ultimately, with the union. The
ability of one worker to stand up for another may well be a
first step towards the realization that there is strength in
collective action. This may simply be the beginning of the
equalization of bargaining power that was stated so
eloquently by Justice Brennan in Weingarten.97
The significance of a Weingarten right in the non-
unionized workplace may go beyond whether it can achieve
any practical gain in a particular employee situation. The
right really tests society's commitment to protect the
aggregation of small steps that ultimately leads to a full-
blown selection of a bargaining representative. If we view
the Weingarten right as more than merely symbolic, but as
a vital component of the nascent stages of unionization, just
like the rights of workers in non-union workplaces to take
concerted action, then there is no question but that it
applies to the non-union workplace. It is a reading of the
Act that embraces the ninety percent of the work force that
does not presently enjoy the advantages of union
representation.
This is a story that must be developed from the
language of the statute, from the history behind it, from an
understanding of the workplace of today and what workers
value in it, and from a debunking of some of the myths
about the irresponsibility of workers.
94. Id.
95. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
96. Id. at 15.
97. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262 (1975).
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These are lessons that emerge from Values and
Assumptions. Virginia Seitz learned them when she was a
student of Jim's. Wilma Liebman learned them when she
read his book. Values and Assumptions is very much alive
in the articles and thinking of both those authors. I hope
Jim will continue to teach Wilma and the rest of the Board.

